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THE UNITED STATES, THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: WILL 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE PREVAIL DESPITE US RECALCITRANCE 
INTRODUCTION 
Since 1945 when international criminal justice first became a reality the US has been its greatest 
champion and supporter. As part of the allied movement, the US played a central role in the creation of 
the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal.1 Its support for the process continued through the Tokyo 
trial, and the various successor trials of Nazi doctors, lawyers, military leaders, political leaders among 
others.2 The adoption of the convention on the prevention and punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
also highlights the importance of US support. Unlike the reticent Britain, the US was at the front line 
pushing for adoption of the convention. Additionally, in 1992 when proposals for international 
prosecution resurfaced following the outbreak of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the US took the initiative 
on a Security Council resolution to establish a commission of inquiry into reports of widespread 
violations of international humanitarian law.3  
Interestingly enough, the US actively participated in the drafting process that led to the adoption of the 
Rome Statute. The International Law Commission’s draft text was refined through a series of 
preparatory conferences in which the US played an active role, and even after the adoption of the 
Statute the US has supported international courts for Sierra Leone and Cambodia. More importantly, the 
ICC signifies the same values of global justice, human rights and the rule of law that the US is committed 
to.4 Why then did the US withdraw its support for the ICC at the eleventh hour? What impact has this 
had on the Security Council’s power to act when National authorities are unable and unwilling? In order 
to fully understand this question we must delve into the complex relationship between the US and the 
Security Council. 
The Security Council and international criminal justice 
Before the ICC came into the picture it was undoubted that the Security Council was unparalleled in 
matters of international criminal justice. Where National courts were unable or unwilling to prosecute 
perpetrators of the most serious crimes of international concern, the Security Council had to step in 
under its Chapter VII powers. By virtue of article 25 of the UN charter the SC has power to make binding 
decisions over all members of the UN. Additionally, section 29 of the charter furnishes the Council with 
authority to establish whatever subsidiary organs it deems fit. It was in the exercise of this power that 
the SC established the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and empowered the tribunal 
to “put an end to such crimes and take effective measures to bring to justice the persons who are 
responsible for them” and thus “contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace.”5 The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established soon after and for substantially the same 
                                                          
1 Arieh Kochavi, “Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied war crimes, policy and the Question of Punishment” Durham (1998) 
2 T Taylor, “The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials (1992) 
3 UN Doc. S/RES/780 (1992) 
4 “Engage and Prosper,” The Economist, 5 Aug 2000. 
5 SC Resolution 827(1993) preamble. 
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reasons.6 Perhaps there was an element of ‘tribunal fatigue’ that led to the clamour for a permanent 
International Criminal Court that would eliminate the need for SC resolutions creating a new tribunal 
every time a new crisis arises. The genius of the Rome Statute was to build a stable regime founded on 
State consent, rather than the peremptory authority of the Security Council.  
Article 24 of the UN charter confers upon the Security Council primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of International peace and security. One of the most contentious issues in the Rome 
negotiations was the role to be given to the SC in the new Court. The 1994 ILC draft statute which was 
favored by the US required SC permission to be obtained whenever the International Criminal Court 
wanted to act. More particularly, article 23 of the draft statute provided as follows: 
a) The court would not be able to deal with matters of aggression before the council gave a   
determination that the state in question had committed the aggression which was the subject 
matter of the complaint. 
b) The council could refer matters to the court pursuant to chapter VII of the UN charter. 
c) The court could not, in the absence of council approval, commence a prosecution which was 
being dealt with by the council under its Chapter VII powers. 
Had the proposed draft passed without amendment, it is not inconceivable that the US would have 
ratified the treaty without a second thought. The distinctions between the 1994 draft and the final 
version of the Rome Statute unlock the mystery of US opposition. . The ‘like-minded caucus’, which was 
a loose coalition of  states, mainly ‘middle powers’ and ‘developing countries’ attacked the ILC draft 
provision as a serious encroachment upon judicial independence.7This deference to Council 
responsibility in matters of international peace and security was however displaced by the so-called 
‘Singapore’ proposal that the council must act affirmatively in order to suspend an ICC investigation, 
even in the most delicate situations The Rome Statute dislodges the traditional power of the Security 
Council, requiring that a vote for suspension of ICC action be renewed every 12 months8. In order for the 
council to exercise this power it must adopt the resolution under its chapter VII powers identifying a 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression under article 39 of the UN charter. The 
requirement that the Security Council adopt the resolution under chapter VII is a clear indication that 
this power of deferral represents a concession to the peace and security mandate of the council.  
Additionally, the SC has power to refer cases to the prosecutor in a ‘situation in which one or more such 
crimes appear to have been committed’.9 The Prosecutor presumably would then have the discretion to 
decide whether prosecution should be instituted, for while the Statute stipulates when the Court has 
jurisdiction, it does not state that the Court is bound to exercise it, nor can the Council oblige the Court 
to act. For most scholars, it was one of the achievements of the Rome Conference that the Security 
Council’s involvement in the exercise by the court of its jurisdiction is limited to a mere power of referral 
                                                          
6 SC Resolution 955 (1994) 
7 Kirsch and Holmes, “The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court, the Negotiating Process” 93 AJIL 
(1999) 
8 Article 16 of the Rome Statute 
9 Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute 
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to the prosecutor, but to have dispensed with any security council involvement would have gone too 
far.10 
The United States and the Security Council 
Article 23 of the UN charter recognizes the US as one of the permanent members of the SC. Under 
article 27 of the UN Charter decisions in the 15 member Security Council on all substantive matters,for 
example, a decision calling for direct measures related to the settlement of a dispute, require the 
affirmative votes of nine members. A negative vote, a veto, by a permanent member prevents adoption 
of a proposal, even if it has received the required number of affirmative votes. This essentially means 
that the US as one of the P5 could potentially hamper SC action by use of the veto power.  
As the largest economy and the only member of the SC capable of mounting and supporting 
transcontinental military operations with the necessary air transport, technical means of intelligence 
and logistics, the US is highly relevant to the efficacy of the SC.11Nothing shows the power the US has 
over the SC better than SC Resolution 1422 of 2002. This resolution was pushed through the council by 
the US with the threat of refusal to support a peacekeeping operation, and requested the ICC to defer 
any exercise of its jurisdiction for 12 months “if a case arises involving current or former officials or 
personnel from a contributing state not a party to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions relating to a 
UN established or authorized operation.” A further resolution asking for suspension for another 12 
months was adopted in 2003- resolution 1487.12 
Under the Bush administration, the US negotiated bilateral agreements with other states under article 
98(2) of the ICC statute positing that the court will not be able to request surrender of a US national to 
the court without the consent of the ‘sending state.’ Despite these agreements eventually being held 
incapable of preventing the ICC from requesting surrender, they do play an important role in 
demonstrating the lengths the US will go to in order to protect its interests. The US has also passed 
domestic legislation authorizing the president of the US to use military force in order to obstruct the 
operations of the court.13 The prospect of SC referral of cases to the ICC initially lauded as a powerful 
trigger mechanism now seems handicapped in the face of US resistance. 
One of the most crucial issues in as far as the ICC is concerned is that of enforcement. The court relies 
on member states cooperation in order to enforce its rulings. It is surprising that the court was not given 
stronger powers of enforcement. Part 9 of the Rome statute requires state parties to cooperate with the 
court in providing various forms of assistance such as the taking of evidence and the tracing of assets. 
Article 89(1) imposes the all-important obligation to surrender any person within a state’s territory upon 
the request of the court. As regards sentences of imprisonment imposed by the court, there is no 
                                                          
10Dan Sarooshi, “The Peace and Justice Paradox: The International Criminal Court and the UN Security Council” in 
in D. McGoldrick, Chapter 4 
11 Ruth Wedgewood, “The International Criminal Court: An American View” EJIL 1999 
12 Aly Mokhtar, “The fine art of arm-twisting: The US, resolution 1422 and the Security Council deferral power 
under the Rome statute.” (2002) 3 International Criminal Law Review 295 
13 American Service-members’ Protection Act of 2002 
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obligation on states to provide prison facilities, and sentences will be served in a state selected by the 
court from a list of those that have declared their willingness to accept sentenced persons-article 103. 
States are bound by the statute to cooperate with the court failing which an uncooperative state may be 
referred to the Assembly of State Parties or in the case of a referral by the SC, to the council itself.  
Although the council has no power to impose mandatory requirements on the defaulting state, the 
Assembly of State has no power of enforcement14  due to its size and low frequency of meetings. A 
solution to this potential enforcement problem is for the SC to use its chapter VII powers creatively and 
develop a consistent practice of making article 39 determinations that the failure by a state to 
cooperate with the ICC constitutes a threat to the peace and thus constitutes a basis for the imposition 
of chapter VII sanctions against the recalcitrant state.15Evidently, the SC still has a paramount role in the 
administration and enforcement of international criminal justice. Should the US exercise its veto power 
it is clear that the SC will be unable to assist the court in its enforcement functions. 
The ICC as a pillar of hope 
Despite grim convictions that the ICC is doomed to fail without SC, and by extension US, support I 
believe that the court is capable of surviving the onslaught and becoming a symbol of international 
criminal justice. This is because of various reasons chief of which is the fact that the Rome Statute makes 
provisions for the court to function without being fully dependent on the Security Council. I shall 
examine some of these provisions in turn. 
Article 13 provides for three trigger mechanisms; self-referral by state party to the statute, a Security 
Council referral as well as the Prosecutor’s power to initiate an investigation. Thus, even where the SC is 
unable to act in order to mobilize for restoration of international peace and security because of internal 
wrangles (for example the US exercising its veto power against an SC resolution made under chapter 
VII), the court will not be paralyzed and can still commence investigations through the remaining trigger 
mechanisms. This was a very important development that went a long way in strengthening the 
international criminal justice system. More specifically, article 17 of the statute provides that the court 
shall have jurisdiction where the state which has jurisdiction over a case is unwilling or unable genuinely 
to carry out prosecutions or investigations. The Security Council is no longer the alpha and omega of 
international criminal justice. In fact, the result at Rome was a new and exciting international institution, 
distinct from the United Nations and yet exercising authority in a field that had previously been 
occupied, albeit on a piecemeal basis, by the Security Council. In a sense, the Rome Statute was an 
attempt to effect indirectly what could not be done directly, namely reform of the UN and amendment 
of the charter. It is precisely because of this bold and exciting challenge to the existing mechanisms of 
the UN that so many states have enthusiastically joined the new venture.16 
                                                          
14 Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmhurst, International Criminal Law and 
Procedure (2nd edition, Cambridge 2010) 
15 Dan Sarooshi, “The Peace and Justice Paradox: The International Criminal Court and the UN Security Council” in 
in D. McGoldrick, Chapter 4 
16 Ruth Wedgewood, “The International Criminal Court: An American View” (1999) EJIL 
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Another important factor is ICC funding. The Statute stipulates the funds of the court and the Assembly 
of State Parties as assessed contributions made by state parties, and funds provided by the United 
Nation subject to General Assembly approval. In addition, the court may receive voluntary contributions 
in accordance with criteria approved by the Assembly of State Parties.17 The court can therefore 
function and carry out its operations even in cases where the SC makes referrals of situations but fails to 
provide accompanying funding for the investigations. This increases the court’s independence and 
ability to carry out impartial investigations and prosecutions. 
Another contentious issue that further shows the importance of the ICC in matters of international 
criminal justice is its jurisdiction over nationals of non-parties. One of the key fears articulated by the US 
in as far as the court was concerned was that the court would be able to prosecute US nationals even 
though the US has not submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Under the ICC statute the court has 
jurisdiction over nationals of non-party states in three circumstances. First, the ICC may prosecute 
nationals of non-parties in situations referred to the ICC prosecutor by the UN Security Council.18 
Secondly, non-party nationals are subject to ICC jurisdiction when they have committed a crime on the 
territory of a state that is a party to the ICC or has otherwise accepted the jurisdiction of the court with 
respect to that crime.19 Thirdly, jurisdiction may be exercised over the nationals of a non-party state 
where the non-party has consented to the exercise of jurisdiction with respect to a particular crime.20 In 
either of the first two cases the consent of the state of nationality is not a prerequisite to the exercise of 
jurisdiction. Experience has shown that the US can use the SC in order to circumvent this21, but on paper 
at least, the court does have the legal mandate to carry out prosecutions in legitimate cases even 
without the consent of the SC or States in question. 
The Rome Statute entered into force after achieving 60 ratifications in July 2002, decades earlier than 
predicted. Now, about a decade later, the number of ratifications has risen from 66 to 122. The 122nd 
accession by Ivory Coast on 15th February 2013 represents an important milestone in advancing towards 
universal ratification of the Rome Statute. This is an indication that the international community is 
almost wholly behind this noble enterprise and is ready to support the court in carrying out its duties. 
Perhaps the days of US hegemony in the field of international criminal law are behind us. However, in 
order for the ICC to succeed, a growing majority of the world’s nations must support the Court and the 
Rome Statute. As Dominic McGoldrick suggests, if history is any indication the US will eventually come 
on board the ICC wagon. Time, patience and legitimacy may prove the US wrong in the sense that its 
reasons are unfounded in the practice of the ICC. US participation would be a strong encouragement for 
other states that have opposed the ICC to come on board. 
 
 
                                                          
17 Article 115 of the Rome Statute 
18 Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute 
19 Article 12(2)(a)and (3) of the Rome Statute 
20 Ibid. 
21 Security Council Resolution 1422 (2002) 
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Conclusion 
As illustrated by the foregoing analysis the relationship between the United States, the Security Council, 
and International Criminal Justice (with particular emphasis on the ICC) is a complex mish-mash of 
historical, legal and political factors that do not lend themselves to easy resolution. It is true that the 
Security Council has a primary responsibility in matters of International Peace and Security. It is also true 
that the US, being the richest country in the world, and a permanent member of the security council  
has the potential to aid or hamper any SC efforts to discharge its duties in as far as international criminal 
justice is concerned. By not ratifying the Rome Statute, the US dealt a major blow to the ICC and its 
capabilities. However, despite these bleak realities, the international criminal system can and is 
functioning without US support and acquiescence. In the pursuit of justice, neither the SC nor the US is 
indispensable. As evidenced by the number and speed of ratifications to the statute, the volume of 
communications received by the court and the cases already in progress; even though the US may not 
have faith in the system, a large majority of other states do.  As Martin Luther King Jr. aptly put it “…the 
arc of the moral universe is long but it bends towards justice…” 
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